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The foundation of the American criminal justice system rests on the idea that all 
offenders should be treated equally before the law.  However, prior research has shown 
that an offender‟s race may result in differential treatment.  Despite extensive literature 
examining sentencing and race, very little attention has been given to the courtroom 
processes that occur after arrest but prior to sentencing (primarily executed at the 
discretion of the prosecutor).  This study examines three of those pre-sentencing 
processes (dismissals, diversions, and charge reductions) that drastically affect the 
treatment an offender receives during later stages of the proceedings.  Results indicate 
that minorities are significantly more likely to receive dismissals while being 
significantly less likely to receive diversions or charge reductions.  Findings regarding 
geographic location and other variables are also discussed as well as limitations and 
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A society‟s criminal justice system exemplifies many of the social beliefs and values of a 
culture.  “Criminal justice is symbolic in that the criminal law and its enforcement are expected 
to embody fundamental principles in society” (Hagan and Albonetti 1982: 329).  A primary 
tenant of the American system involves the concept of equality before the law.  “It establishes 
the principle that no person or class of persons may be subjected to discriminatory or arbitrary 
treatment.  Justice is to be dispensed only with regard to those considerations explicitly 
embodied in law” (Miethe and Moore 1986).  Racial differences certainly do not fall under legal 
considerations in the application of justice.   
 Apart from philosophical issues of racial equality, a fair and unbiased criminal justice 
system contains tangible benefits toward society.  Tyler (1984) states that minorities who view 
the system as “just and impartial” will gain confidence in the system and outcomes will be 
enhanced – thus increasing their commitment to overall group norms and reducing willingness to 
break the law (Young 1991; Tyler 1984).     
Years after the Civil Rights reform, questions still arise regarding the impact of an 
offender‟s race on criminal justice outcomes, especially involving racial disparities in 
sentencing.  Such questions have not gone unaddressed among researchers.  “Since the early 
1970s sentencing research has focused exclusively on the concept of unwarranted disparity in 
sentencing” (Wellford 2007: 399).  However, much of this prior research on the effect of race 
isolates the effect individual actors or sentencing guidelines have strictly on sentencing, ignoring 
or controlling for earlier case processes.  The interconnected nature of the criminal justice system 
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makes such an omission highly significant.  “The limits we have placed on ourselves in doing 
research on sentencing were appropriate as long as the question was whether guidelines work” 
(Wellford 2007: 400).  “The simple conviction outcome used as the dependent variable in most 
quantitative sentencing research is the result of the discretion of all the actors in the system 
combined” (Bushway and Piehl 2007: 106).  In order to fully understand the overall role of race 
in the justice process, the literature must be expanded in order to include these omitted steps of 
the system.  Specifically, the literature must examine dismissals, diversions (allowing offenders 
to complete programs in exchange for dropping charges), and charge bargaining.  Only once all 
factors that affect the role of race in sentencing can be accounted for can confident judgments be 
made regarding unwarranted disparity in the criminal justice system.  
 The prosecutor plays a vital role in many presentencing discretion points of the criminal 
justice system.  The decision to prosecute, offer alternative-treatment diversions, and give charge 
reductions plays a role in determining the characteristics of which offenders receive certain 
sentences.  However, “[d]espite the essential role of the prosecutor in the criminal sanctioning 
process, research on their decision-making behavior remains remarkably limited” (Shermer and 
Johnson 2009: 2).  The current research attempts to address some of these shortcomings by 
examining characteristics of offenders whose charges are dismissed, receive diversions, and 
whose charges are reduced from felonies to misdemeanors through charge bargaining.  By 
examining these early discretionary points, this research will contribute to a better understanding 
of any racial disparities that exist during the pre-sentencing phases of the courtroom process.  
This project builds on the prior literature by providing a concise summary of prior research on 
prosecutorial discretion in addition to a quantitative analysis of the role of race in receiving court 
dismissals, diversions, and charge reductions across various jurisdictions in the United States.  
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With a better understanding of these processes, the effects of prosecutorial discretion and its 
relation to race can be further analyzed and understood.   
 
Literature Review 
 The prosecutor in the American criminal justice system possesses great power over 
criminal cases.  “Prior historical analyses indicate the American prosecutor enjoys independence 
and discretionary privilege unmatched in the world” (Albonetti 1987: 292).  Prosecutors execute 
this discretionary privilege in a few discrete points during criminal justice proceedings. “The 
modern American prosecutor exercises unfettered discretion in three significant screening 
decisions: (1) The circumstances in which a criminal charge will be filed, (2) the level at which a 
criminal charge will be filed, and (3) when to discontinue prosecution” (Albonetti and Hepburn 
1996: 63).
1
  Many of these decisions are not driven by strict guidelines; instead the system relies 
on the prosecutor to use his or her judgment.  The existing literature on each of these discretion 
points will be examined individually, starting with the initial charging and case dismissals, 
followed by diversions, and finishing with the charge bargaining process.  
 
                                                          
1
Of course, this list is not all-inclusive, as prosecutors also play a role at other points in the criminal justice system.  
Prior studies on other aspects of prosecutorial behavior also generally find racial differences among groups, 
lending support to the notion that a racial bias may exist in the prosecutor’s behavior.  For example, studies that 
examine racial bias in prosecutorial-driven “downward departures” from sentencing guidelines show that blacks, 
Hispanics, and offenders with lower education levels were less likely to receive a lesser sentence (Mustard 2001; 
Spohn and Fornage 2009).  Such effects may be exacerbated in counties where there is a higher percentage of 




Charge Rejections and Case Dismissals 
 The initial decision to press or reject charges remains one of the least visible and most 
important decisions made by the prosecutor.  Despite recent changes to the criminal justice 
system designed to increase overall visibility and accountability (such as sentencing guidelines), 
prosecutors have avoided any such restrictions on the charging decision.  Today we may actually 
know less about the charge/drop decision point than we did twenty years ago due to the 
discontinuation of large scale databases examining the topic.
2
   
 In the mid 1980s, two studies came out that rigorously examined the prosecutor‟s 
decision to bring or reject charges against offenders.  The earlier study by Petersilia (1983) 
attempted to measure the charge/drop decision quantitatively on a large scale. 
In order to study the charge/drop decision, Petersilia used a dataset from the California 
Offender-Based Transaction Statistics from 1980, which contained information on 190,000 
offenders.  She included race as two dichotomous variables (black/not black and Hispanic/not 
Hispanic), controlled for prior record, and included a dichotomous “violent offense” variable.  
She also included a model that conceptualized “charges dropped” to only include individuals 
who had no charges of any type filed against them; individuals charged with a misdemeanor 
were classified as having charges pressed against them. 
She found that prosecutors were more likely to charge blacks and Hispanics with felony 
charges.  However, when including individuals charged with misdemeanors in the outcome 
variables, Petersilia found that whites actually had a greater likelihood to be charged than blacks 
or Hispanics.  In the sample, 20% of whites were released without any charges, compared to 
27% of Hispanics and 32% of blacks.   
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 Primarily, the discontinuation of the Prosecutor’s Management Information System (PROMIS) in the early 1990s 
drastically limited the amount of available data on the subject. 
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 Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch (1987) also examined the effect of race on the charging 
decision.  Using data from the Los Angeles Country Prosecutor‟s Management Information 
System (PROMIS), they took a random sample of 70,000 offenders arrested for felony offenses 
between 1977 and 1980.  In order to avoid issues related to charge bargaining (where a 
prosecutor might file multiple charges intending to drop some later in exchange for a guilty 
plea), they limited their sample to offenders with only one charge.   
To measure race, they coded the offender‟s ethnicities into two dichotomous variables: 
black and Hispanic.  They included controls for age, gender, use of a weapon, offense severity, 
and prior criminal record.  Finally, they conceptualized charge in two ways, including two 
outcome variables.  The first outcome variable, charge rejected, indicated the prosecutor initially 
made the decision to drop the charges.  The second outcome variable indicated if the charges 
were dropped at any point in the process.  This variable includes decisions made by courtroom 
actors other than the prosecutor, and a charge dropped after the initial filing is usually done in an 
open court (increasing the visibility of the decision). 
Spohn et al. found that whites have a significantly greater probability than blacks of 
having their charges rejected by the prosecutor before the formal filing of charges.  However, 
once the charges reach the court, the researchers did not find a racial effect in dismissals.  They 
attribute this finding to the greater visibility of the courtroom process.   
The authors of both of these articles admit a few major weaknesses relevant to the 
proposed research.  Despite the fact that Spohn et al. heavily emphasize the importance of 
accounting for strength of evidence (citing that 71% of cases were dropped due to lack of 
evidence), neither researcher includes controls for it, as individual qualitative case details are 
usually unavailable while using aggregate-level data.  Additionally, Petersilia only examines 
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offenders with one charge against them in order to account for effect of charge bargaining.  
However, such a distinction excludes any prosecutorial effects among offenders who receive 
more than one charge, a common occurrence.    
Spohn, Beichner, and Davis Frenzel (2001) also examine offender characteristics that 
result in the decision not to prosecute, although not on the scale of the prior two studies.  Using 
all 140 sexual battery cases cleared by arrest in Miami in 1997, they did not find any significant 
offender racial effects; this lack of findings may be partially explained by the small sample size.  
In their dataset, minorities were slightly more likely to have their charges rejected.    
 Other research relevant to an offender‟s race and charging decisions has examined the 
victim‟s (rather than the offender‟s) race and the interactions between the two.  “The value or 
sanctity of white lives may be seen by white-dominated communities or prosecutors to be higher 
than the value of black lives” (Paternoster 1984: 473).  As such, a black offender victimizing a 
white individual may be seen as more heinous and morally offensive to the community.  The 
existing research focuses mainly on the offenses of rape and murder. 
LaFree (1980) used a sample of individuals charged with “forcible sex offenses” in a 
Midwestern city between 1970 and 1975.  He found that offender race played a major role in 
courtroom outcomes.  Black men raping white women only accounted for 23% of the total 
incidents reported and 23.6% of the overall arrests, but represented 31.1% of cases where felony 
charges were brought against the offender and 50% of cases with resulting sentences longer than 
5 years.  He concluded, “Compared to other defendants, blacks who assault white women receive 
more serious charges, are more likely to have their case processed as a felony…and receive 
longer sentences” (LaFree 1980:  852). 
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Victim and offender race also play a role in the likelihood of a prosecutor bringing capital 
charges against a defendant.  Paternoster (1984) examined 1,800 cases of non-negligent 
homicide in South Carolina between 1977 and 1981.  After controlling for various aggravating 
circumstances (such as torture of the victim), Paternoster found that blacks who kill whites are 
almost four and a half times more likely to receive a capital charge when compared to blacks 
who kill other blacks, while whites who kill blacks are no more likely to receive a capital charge 
than whites who kill other whites.  Weiss, Lee, and Berk (1996) also examined the factors that 
affected the likelihood of receiving a capital charge, and similarly found that having a white or 
Asian victim resulted in a four times larger likelihood of receiving a capital charge.   
Other studies have examined the charge/drop decision point without including any racial 
considerations.  Albonetti (1986) found that the factors that affect charging involve the physical 
evidence present in each case, the relationship between victim and offender, and whether or not 
the criminal was arrested at the scene of the crime.  Frazier and Haney (1996) also found other 
legally relevant factors that have an influence on the decision to press charges involve an 
offender‟s prior criminal history and the seriousness of the offense, as prosecutors dedicate more 
resources toward prosecuting more severe offenses.   
Apart from quantitative studies, some researchers have focused on ethnographic studies 
and interviews with prosecutors in order to capture their subjective reasons for rejecting cases.  
For example, Frohmann (1991) found that prosecutors of sexual assault were heavily concerned 
“with maintaining a high conviction rate to promote an image of the „community‟s legal 
protector‟” (Frohmann 1991: 315).  Due to this concern, prosecutors filed charges mainly for 
what they considered strong or winnable cases.  Victim credibility factors heavily into the 
prosecutor‟s decision in these cases, as victims often comprise the majority of the available 
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evidence against an individual.  Similarly, Schmidt and Steury (1989) found that seriousness of 
the offense, strength of evidence, and prior convictions also played a role in bringing charges 
against an offender.    
Studies focusing on the effect of sex on prosecutor‟s case processing decisions also 
examine race variables in the context of gender.  For example, Spohn and Spears (1997) found 
that females were more likely to have their charges rejected, although their results were based off 
of a sample containing a relatively small number of female defendants (648).  Additionally, they 
found that white females were more likely than white males to have their charges rejected by the 
prosecutor, although there was no observed effect for black females when compared to black 
males or for white offenders when compared to black offenders.  Similarly, Spears and Spohn 
(1997) focused on victim gender and the prosecutorial charging decision in rape cases, but also 
included a variable for race of the suspect.  They found that the race of the suspect did not impact 
the charging decision, although they did not include a variable for a black offender victimizing a 
white woman or vice versa.  The behavior of the victim at the time of the incident and the age of 
the victim did significantly affect the likelihood of an offender receiving charges, although, 
notably, strength of evidence did not significantly predict charging decisions.
3
   
Due to the interconnected nature of the criminal justice system, studies that examine post-
filing case dismissals are also germane to the decision to file charges against an individual.  “If 
discrimination is concentrated in the earlier decision-making stages [such as dismissals], research 
which does not account for the processual nature of decision making or which analyses 
populations just at the later decision points will tend to produce findings of no discrimination” 
(Thomson and Zingraff 1981: 871).  As such, the entire charging process must be examined, as 
merely examining one part may miss a bias during other parts of the process. Of course, the 
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 Although “presence of physical evidence” was extremely close to significance, with a p < .053.   
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possibility exists that if prosecutor unjustly files charges against black and Hispanic offenders at 
a greater rate without legal merit during the low-visibility screening process, the courtroom 
dismissal phase will favor the minority defendants as a “correction” to the charging bias (such as 
that found in Spohn et al. 1987 and Petersilia 1983).  Generally, however, little research has been 
done on the significant characteristics of offenders who receive post-filing case dismissals.  The 
existing literature, done by Jordan et al. (2003) and Ryan et al. (2007), focuses on juveniles and 
sexual offenders. 
Jordan et al. (2003) did not find any racial effects in the likelihood of offenders arrested 
for stalking receiving a court dismissal.  They did, however, find a significant inverse 
relationship between criminal history and case dismissal.    
 Ryan et al. (2007) examined juvenile court outcomes tied to delinquents‟ welfare status, 
including racial variables in their analysis.  They found both African Americans and Hispanics 
were significantly less likely to have their cases dismissed in juvenile court.  They did not, 
however, include a variable for prior record or gender, which may confound the results. 
 As previously mentioned, scarcity of data makes it difficult to directly examine both the 
charge/drop decision point and courtroom dismissals.  The research literature, mainly focused on 
charging, has shown evidence that racial discrepancies exist in the prosecutorial decision to file 
charges.  However, additional considerations affect the results individuals receive as they 
progress through the criminal justice process.  Even if a prosecutor files charges against an 
individual, the diversion and charge bargaining process may drastically affect their experienced 






 Another criminal justice proceeding that relies on the judgment of the prosecutor involves 
diverting offenders into treatment programs in exchange for the discontinuation of criminal 
proceedings.  The decision to divert a case ends criminalization of the offender upon successful 
completion of the project.  Thus, should racial disparities exist in the prosecutor‟s decision to 
offer a diversion (or the offender‟s decision to accept it) and the offenders later receive guilty 
dispositions, that group of offenders would exhibit a greater criminal history than the group 
participating in the diversion programs.  I will examine the few available studies by looking first 
at research that focused on adult offenders, then juvenile offenders. 
 An example of such a diversion program began in 1989 in Pheonix, Arizona, where 
prosecution was deferred in order to offer a voluntary drug treatment for offenders without 
significant criminal histories.  This process occurred after the initial decision to reject charges 
outright, and prosecution would cease after successful completion of the diversion program 
(Albonetti 1996).  
 Albonetti (1996) used a logistic regression to determine which variables accounted for 
significant variation in the dependent variable.  Her findings showed that race did not affect the 
likelihood of receiving a diversion.  She did find that younger defendants were more likely to 
receive a diversion than older defendants, and that increases in criminal history (measured 
through prior arrests), having a greater number of initial charges, and being male all decreased 
the likelihood of receiving a diversion.  Using an interaction between race and prior record 
resulted in an interesting finding:  minorities received a penalty during this phase of the process 
only if they did not have a prior record.  Surprisingly, minorities with a prior record had a greater 
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likelihood of receiving a diversion.   Albonetti attributes this finding to prosecutors having 
differing associations with ascribed and achieved status among different groups of offenders. 
 Engen et al. (2003) examined two diversion programs in Washington state from 1989-
1991, one targeted toward first time offenders and one targeted toward sex offenders.  Judges in 
Washington used the diversionary programs for 25% and 47% (respectively) of the cases in 
which the offenders were eligible.  Using dichotomous dependent variables, the authors run a 
logistic regression and determine that males, minorities (blacks and Hispanics), and young 
offenders were significantly less likely to receive a diversion.  Specifically, the odds of a 
minority receiving a diversion were only 30-70% of the odds for similar white offenders.   
Apart from the Albonetti and Engen studies, court diversion research remains extremely 
sparse and has focused primarily on juvenile offenders.  Studies examining diversion in juveniles 
have generally found that minorities are less likely to receive a pretrial diversion than whites 
(Leiber and Johnson 2008).  Additionally, researchers usually find some form of anti-black bias 
in the court diversion process (e.g. Leiber and Stairs 1999; Leiber 1994
4
; Leiber, Johnson, Fox, 
& Lacks, 2007).  Such results may not result from an anti-minority bias; similar to charge 
bargaining, minorities may voluntarily choose not to participate in diversions at a greater rate 
than white youths (Leiber and Stairs 1999).  
 Prior research has not uniformly found an anti-minority bias, however.  Barrett, 
Katsiyannis, and Zhang (2006) actually found that minorities and males were more likely to be 
diverted than prosecuted in juvenile court using the South Carolina Department of Juvenile 
Justice Management data.  
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 Adding to the complexity of studying diversions involves the myriad processes different 
jurisdictions use in their diversion programs.  Diversion may occur as a result of prosecutorial 
discretion, judicial discretion, or both.  Additionally, diversion may occur before or after the 
prosecutor formally charges in court (Schmidt and Steury 1989).  As such, research attempting to 
draw cross-county comparisons between prosecutorial discretion must remain extremely vigilant 
of these different processes.  Given the relative scarcity of studies, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about the existing relationship between race and diversions.    Due to this fact, it is 
imperative for more research to be done on this topic due to the impact diversionary programs 
have on justice outcomes.  Individuals not selected for diversionary backgrounds gain greater 
criminal histories, harming their chances for housing and employment while also increasing the 
severity of future sanctions.   
  
Charge Bargaining 
 In addition to the initial charging and diversion decisions, prosecutors also have a large 
amount of discretion in determining which charges to bring against an offender.  “Prosecutors in 
American jurisdictions wield enormous „sentencing‟ power because they have virtually 
unreviewable discretion to select the initial charges and decide which charges to drop as part of 
plea bargaining” (Frase 2000: 440 qtd. in Shermer and Johnson 2009).  Sentencing research that 
focuses merely on the discretion of the judge and does not include a measure for actual charges 
brought against the offender may not capture any “hidden” racial discrepancies that may exist.    
Through the manipulation of charges, prosecutors have the ability to drastically increase or 
reduce final sentences, especially under sentencing guidelines.  The research literature on 
discretion in sentencing generally chooses to control for the prosecutor‟s involvement by 
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examining only offenders with similar final charges rather than measuring the effects of charging 
itself.  Failing to account for the charging step allows courtroom actors to appear unbiased in the 
visible sentencing stage, while in reality minority offenders may be getting charged at different 
rates.  Previous research on charging examined the “value” of each charge bargain as well as the 
effect charge bargaining has on the strict number of charges brought against an individual. 
 Initial research approached the subject of charge bargaining from a labeling theory 
perspective, choosing to examine society‟s reaction to criminal offenders deemed as “deviant” to 
the community.  Studies such as Bernstein et al. (1977) and Holmes et al. (1987) used 
independent variables such as criminal history, race, age, and sex to determine which offenders 
received bargains.  These early studies used ordinal scales to determine the value of each charge 
bargain, assigning a numeric value to each level of felony/misdemeanor and then subtracting to 
determine the worth of each plea agreement.  Perhaps due to the rough conceptualizations of 
bargain value, these studies found that black offenders generally fared the same as white 
offenders in the charge bargaining process. 
 Albonetti (1992) later examined the decision to reduce charges from the felony to the 
misdemeanor level.  Her dataset (taken from 400 burglary and robbery charges in 1979-1980 
Jacksonville, FL) includes the officer‟s initial arrest charges.  Her conceptualization of charge 
reduction focuses on the prosecutor‟s initial filing: she codes cases as “reduced” when the officer 
elected to arrest an individual with felony level charges and the prosecutor filed charges at the 
misdemeanor level.  Her study also did not find any direct racial effect; significant variables 
included case seriousness (measured by a dichotomous “Use of Weapon” variable), age, gender, 
and victim/offender relationship.  Surprisingly, prior criminal history did not have an effect on 
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the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction, although being labeled a “habitual offender” did 
result in a significant higher probability of receiving felony charges. 
  Farnworth and Teske (1995) examined gender bias in criminal processing, finding that 
females were more likely to have the seriousness of their charges reduced and white females 
were more likely to receive such a charge reduction than black females.  Ball (2006) focused 
rather on the strict number of charges and their resulting reduction as a result of charge 
bargaining.  Simply examining the reduction in number of charges did not reveal any legally 
irrelevant offender characteristics playing a significant role.  This conclusion, however, may 
have been marred by the fact that he merely looked at the reduction of the number of charges, 
rather than their value or resulting sentence, in a sample containing very few white or Hispanic 
offenders (Roughly 10% each).  He did reaffirm the importance of offense seriousness and prior 
criminal history in his analysis.  
 Bushway and Piehl (2007) provide an excellent explanation of the legally relevant and 
irrelevant factors that play a role in the prosecutor‟s decision to offer a charge bargain.  In order 
to demonstrate the hydraulic nature of the criminal justice system, they chose to examine the 
value of charge bargains (expected sentence based on the charges – final sentence) in two 
counties.  One county had strict mandatory sentencing guidelines and the other did not.  They 
hypothesized that restricting the sentencing discretion of the judge would merely shift the 
decision to the prosecutor through the charge bargaining process. 
 Bushway and Piehl‟s findings were consistent with their hypothesis that charge 
bargaining played a greater role in changing sentencing outcomes in the counties with guidelines 
after they incorporated controls into their data to control for differential offending.  Interestingly 
(and more relevant to the proposed research), they also found that race, age, and gender had 
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more explanatory power in counties that limited judicial discretion.  The guidelines, intended to 
ensure equal sentencing across demographic lines, merely shifted their consideration from the 
judge to the prosecutor.  However, Bushway and Piehl do note that the characteristics that are 
relevant to the value of the charge bargain may not be the same as the characteristics that affect 
who receives a charge bargain.   
 Shermer and Johnson (2009) used the Federal Justice Statistics Program from fiscal year 
2001 in order to examine the characteristics of defendants charged in federal courts who receive 
charge reductions, defined as a reduction in the statutory maximum between filing offense and 
final conviction offense.  As expected, female offenders had a greater chance of receiving a 
charge reduction when compared to males.  Surprisingly, they did not find any general racial or 
age effects, nor did prior history play a role in charge reductions.  They also determined type of 
offense affects the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction, as offenders charged with property 
crimes had a greater likelihood of receiving a reduction than those offenders charged with violent 
offenses.  This focus on offense type also did have some differences across racial lines when 
examining the interaction between offense type and race; minorities (including blacks and 
Hispanics in this case) were less likely to have their charges reduced for offenses involving 
weapons, while Hispanics (counter-intuitively) were more likely to receive a reduction for drug 
offenses (perhaps due to initial overcharging).  Finally, they also determined that pretrial 
detention significantly reduced the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction.   
 Finally, one must note prosecutors engage in charge bargaining in order to induce guilty 
pleas from the offenders (Shermer and Johnson 2009).  Due to the fact racial differentials exist in 
the probabilities of pleading guilty (e.g. Albonetti 1997 states that black defendants are less 
likely to plead guilty), the possibility exists prosecutors may alter their behavior due to this racial 
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differential, or, if racial favoritism is found, prosecutors may offer minorities defendants similar 
plea bargains but the offenders themselves chose to reject the plea.  Thus, strict causality 
couched in racial bias in misdemeanor plea deals cannot be absolutely ascertained; racial 
differential in plea behavior may also play a role.   
   
Hypotheses 
The existing literature forms the basis of my expectations for the current research.  All of 
the examined prior research has revealed that racial discrepancies may be found when isolating 
the prosecutor‟s discretion points.  However, many of these studies fail to include adequate 
control for legally relevant or irrelevant factors (e.g. Ryan et al. 2007), use extremely small 
samples (e.g. Spears and Spohn 1997), fail to compare multiple locations (e.g. Albonetti 1996), 
or use decades-old data (e.g. Spohn et al. 1987).  Despite these limitations, the majority of the 
existing literature does indicate that race does affect many of the prosecutor‟s decisions.  Both 
race of offender and race of victim appear to influence the decision to charge individuals (e.g. 
Petersilia 1983).  Minority status also reduces the likelihood of receiving a pretrial diversion (e.g. 
Leiber and Johnson 2008), although the findings are mixed (Albonetti 1996).  Prosecutors may 
also offer more lucrative charge bargains to white offenders (e.g. Bushway and Piehl 2007).  
These effects are found across multiple jurisdictions in all regions of the United States.   
In total, 17 of 24 studies found that race affected the criminal justice process in some 
way.  These 17 studies also included many of the more methodologically rigorous studies.  For a 
full summary of the examined literature, see Table 1.     
Although the exact impact of race varied by study, the presence of significant anti-
minority findings in each category leads me to believe that one‟s minority status will also result 
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in negative outcomes in my study of dismissals, diversions, and charge bargaining.
5
   Due to the 
presence of an anti-minority bias in the majority of studies and the consistent findings of an anti-
minority bias in other areas of the criminal justice process,
6
 I expect that whites will be favored 
over minorities in the dismissal, diversion, and charge bargaining process.  Specifically, I 
anticipate the following:  
 Hypothesis 1: Whites have a greater likelihood than minorities of the prosecutor 
choosing to discontinue prosecution or having their charges dismissed. 
 Hypothesis 2: Whites have a greater likelihood than minorities of receiving and 
accepting the option of a pretrial diversion.   
 Hypothesis 3: Whites have a greater likelihood than minorities of receiving and 
accepting the option to plea felony charges down to a misdemeanor. 
Due to the fact that these anti-minority effects were found in all jurisdictions and regions 
of the country, I expect that the results will be consistent across regions when controlling for the 
geographic location of the sample.   
 Hypothesis 4:  Whites will be consistently favored across jurisdictions when 





                                                          
5
 Of course, it must be noted that the findings were mixed in all three categories, as some studies did not show a 
racial effect.  However, some studies were not able to include multiple control variables due to data constraints 
(e.g. Barrett, Katsiyannis, and Zhang 2006) and other studies showed racial effects when certain controls were 
added (e.g. Albonetti 1996 did not find racial effects overall, but did find minorities suffered when a race and prior 
record interaction was included).   
6
 For example, many studies have shown an anti-minority bias in sentencing.  See Mitchell (2005), Spohn and 






 In order to examine offender characteristics which determine charge reductions, 
diversions, and court dismissals, this study uses the Bureau of Justice Statistics‟ State Court 
Processing Statistics (SCPS) from 2000, 2002, and 2004.  The sample of the SCPS is collected 
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  It includes all felony-level case filings in May in a stratified 
random sample from 40 of the United States‟ 75 most populous counties.  The dataset contains 
information on 45,954 unique defendants, and includes demographic information as well as 
detailed charge and disposition content.  Table 2 shows all variables with a brief description and 
coding.  Table 3 shows the number of offenders in each variable, and Table 4 shows the number 
of offenders in each variable separated by race.   
 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
 The SCPS dataset contains a number of strengths that allow an excellent analysis of the 
various points of interest in the courtroom process.  The dataset has extensive demographic 
information on each offender, allowing analysis of almost 46,000 unique individuals while 
controlling for race, gender, and age.  The dataset also contains information on Hispanic 
ethnicity, allowing the research to account for any ethnic bias in addition to racial bias, a 
weakness of many other studies on anti-minority bias (e.g. Spohn and Spears 1997).  
Unfortunately, Asian and Native American offenders remain drastically underrepresented in the 
dataset when compared to whites, blacks, and Hispanics, excluding them from the analysis.
7
   
                                                          
7
 Due to their small numbers, any offender listed as Asian (826 offenders), Native American (106 offenders), or 
missing the ethnicity variable (1,083 offenders) will be dropped from the data set.   
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 Another strength of the data is the inclusion of a cross-jurisdictional sample of offenders.  
The large scope of the data allows multiple regions and jurisdictions to be included in the 
analysis; the analysis is not based simply on a comparison between one or two counties.  I ran 
models both controlling for state-specific fixed effects as well as models allowing a cross-
regional comparison.  Including these location controls prevents omitted local-level variables 
(such as specific law enforcement policies or pressure from politicians) from skewing the overall 
results. Due to the difficulty in capturing these local elements in a quantitative data set, many 
studies acknowledge the risks of omitting these variables while only examining one jurisdiction 
(e.g. Leiber and Stairs 1999).  A cross-jurisdictional sample may provide support that any racial 
effects do not simply occur from unobservable location-specific omitted variables.   
Finally, the SCPS data includes court disposition data for every offender who had felony 
charges filed against him or her, allowing a researcher to isolate offenders who pled guilty, were 
found guilty through trial, were diverted, or had their cases dismissed.  This inclusion permits my 
sample to include offenders who had charges filed against them without eventually being found 
guilty – a key feature of the SCPS, as many other available data sets restrict their sample only to 
offenders sentenced for a crime. 
A major weakness of the SCPS involves omitted variable bias.  The dataset does not 
provide specific details on some legally relevant or irrelevant variables that affect case outcomes 
that exist in other datasets.  Although this project cannot fully account for any omitted variable 
bias, the relevant variables missing are partially subjective in nature and generally not included 
in a quantitative data set.  I include the considerations of these omitted variables and their effect 
on causality in my discussion.  The inability to explain the mechanisms causing the disparities 
with complete certainty remains a weakness of the data, but simply demonstrating that a 
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relationship exists could form a foundation for future research that focuses on explanatory 
theories for such a disparity.   
  
Missing Data 
Certain cases in the SCPS are missing data for some variables.  The SCPS sample 
contains 5,247 cases (11.54% of the total observations) that were not adjudicated within a 1-year 
period of initial filing, and an additional 1068 (2.4%) cases where the adjudication was listed as 
“missing.”  Black offenders are slightly overrepresented in these cases, accounting for 3148 
(49.8%) of the cases.  Following the lead of Bushway and Piehl (2007), I employed listwise 
deletion and did not include these cases in my analyses; all of the following descriptive statistics 
do not include these pending/missing cases.  Removing these cases reduces the sample size to 
39,639. 
 All missing data for the rest of the variables falls within +/- 4% of the overall racial 
sample proportions; there is no evidence of systematic omissions from the data (see Table 5 for 
descriptive statistics of missing variables).  Additionally, most of the remaining variables (with 
the exceptions of public defender and probation/parole status) are only missing data for 4% or 
less of the total number of observations.  I again employed listwise deletion and dropped the 
observations with missing data for the variables missing 4% of less of the total observations.  
Due to the small number of cases missing data, I do not anticipate this approach significantly 
affecting the coefficients or the standard errors.  To account for public defender (missing data for 
21% of observations) and probation/parole status (missing data for 7% of observations) I ran 
analyses with and without these two variables to determine if they significantly affect the impact 
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of an offender‟s race.  I also ran a regression with a dichotomous control variable that represents 
cases with missing variables to ensure the missing data does not change the results of the model.   
 
Dependent Variables 
 The SCPS sample contains a dichotomous variable that indicates which charges were 
dismissed. It must be noted that the SCPS data does not differentiate between court dismissals 
(cases thrown out by the judge) and nolle prosequi (cases where the prosecutor elects to drop the 
charges post-filing).  Due to this fact, the dismissal variable captures elements of judicial 
discretion.  As such, any conclusions drawn about the actions of the prosecutor as a result of the 
findings of the dismissal variable must be examined with caution.  Additionally, the dataset only 
captures individuals who had their charges dismissed after initial filing, so any offenders who 
had their charges rejected by the prosecutor will not appear in the sample.  The dismissal 
variable is coded dichotomously, with a value of 1 indicating the offender had their charges 
dismissed after filing.  For a full statistical description of all variables, see Table 3.   
 The SCPS dataset also includes an outcome variable for individuals who were “diverted” 
into special treatment programs.  These programs usually require the completion of a type of 
counseling or treatment (such as anger management or drug rehabilitation) in exchange for 
dropping the charges upon successful completion of the program.  In most jurisdictions, the 
prosecutor recommends diversion on a discretionary basis, although the judge may also elect to 
divert certain offenders into different specialized treatment courts.
8
 These programs are 
voluntary, and the offender must accept the diversion in order to be entered into a specialized 
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 The dataset also includes a variable that splits diversions into “prosecutorial diversion,” “special treatment 
court,” “other,” and “deferred adjudication.”  “Prosecutorial diversion” will also be included as the outcome 
variable in a model.   
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program.  In my project, the diversion variable is coded dichotomously, with a value of 1 
indicating an offender was offered and accepted entry into a diversion program.   
To investigate charge bargaining, this project examines which offenders were allowed to 
plea down to a misdemeanor after the initial filing of felony charges.
9
  The failure to include the 
final number of charges makes the approach of looking at the difference between initial and final 
charges unfeasible.   
The SCPS data contains 4,264 offenders whose final most serious charge fell at the 
misdemeanor level.  Due to the fact that all offenders in the dataset initially had felony-level 
charges filed against them, the resulting misdemeanor charges indicate a reduction in severity at 
some point in the process.  Guilty pleas accounted for 4,108 of the 4,264 misdemeanor charges 
(The remainder are accounted for by offenders who received multiple charges initially.  These 
offenders later had their felony charges dismissed or were acquitted on the felony counts but still 
convicted for the misdemeanors).  This variable is also coded dichotomously with a value of 1 
indicating the offender was allowed to plead his or her felony charges down to a misdemeanor.  
In order to isolate charge bargaining, the comparison group only includes individuals who also 
entered guilty pleas but did not have their charges reduced to the misdemeanor level.
10
  Only 
examining offenders who entered guilty pleas prevents including offenders who were offered a 
charge bargain but elected not to accept it. 
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 Such a change in charges is worth investigating due to the resulting affect on subsequent arrests and sentences; 
many states give an increased “point score” to prior felony convictions as compared to misdemeanor convictions 
when determining the category an offender falls into under sentencing guidelines (the state of Florida’s sentencing 
guidelines, set forth in 1995, is an example of such).  Additionally, Welch et al. (1984) found that prior convictions 
predicts sentencing better than prior arrests, and that prior felony convictions has a slightly greater effect than 
prior convictions as whole.  As such, felony convictions could have a significant impact on future criminal justice 
outcomes for members of various races if the reduction to a misdemeanor occurred with unequal propensity.  
10
 Additionally, separate analyses will be run only involving offenders who initially only had one charge at the 
felony level filed against them to account for any effects due to overcharging with the intent to induce a guilty 




 Race, the main independent variable of interest, contains offenders split into six 
categories: white, black, Hispanic, Native American, Asian, and missing.  Of the 39,639 total 
offenders, the sample contains 11,841 (30%) white defendants, 16,152 (41%) black defendants, 
9,631 (24%) Hispanic defendants, 106 ( < 1%) Native American defendants, 826 (2%) Asian 
defendants, and 1,083 (3%) defendants with missing information on their race or ethnicity.  I 
limit my analyses to only include black, white, and Hispanic offenders due to the low number of 
other races.  Two mutually exclusive dichotomous variables are included for black and Hispanic 
offenders, with a 1 indicating an offender is a member of that ethnicity.  An individual with 0 for 
both the black and Hispanic variables indicates the individual was originally included in the 
dataset as “white,” and comprises my comparison group.  For a description of all variables by 
racial group, see Table 4.  
  
Control Variables – Legally Relevant Variables 
Shermer and Johnson (2009) found that offense type played a significant role in 
determining charge reductions.  As such, offense type is controlled for in the analyses.  The 
dataset contains categorical information on type of offense for the most serious charge filed.  
Dichotomous variables type of offense include: murder, rape, robbery, assault, other violent, 
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, forgery, fraud, other property, drug sales, other drug, 
weapons, driving related, and other public order.  Each variable is dichotomous and mutually 
exclusive, with a value of “1” indicating the offenders‟ most serious charge fell into that offense 
category.  Separating offenders into these detailed types of offense categories grants some 
measure of offense severity – murders are generally regarded as more serious offenses than 
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assaults, and assaults or robberies more serious than larcenies.  For a detailed breakdown of type 
of offense by race, see Table 6.  Consistent with prior literature, black offenders are 
overrepresented in the violent offense categories (see e.g. Hindelang 1978).   
Other legally relevant control variables must also be included.  Consistent with the 
research of Welch et al (1984), to measure prior record a prior felony convictions variable is 
included.  The prior felony convictions variable is an ordinal variable which indicates number of 
prior convictions until 10 prior felony convictions, at which point a “10+” category is used 
(coded as “10”).  Only 1.7% of offenders have 10+ prior felony convictions.    
The number of initial charges also plays a role in charge bargaining, as the presence of a 
large number of charges may indicate an attempt by the prosecutor to make the charge bargain 
more “attractive” by dropping the additional charges.  A dichotomous single-charge variable was 
created, with a value of “1” indicating the offender initially only had a single charge filed against 
them.  For the charge bargaining analyses, separate models were included for offenders with only 
one initial charge at the felony level in order to account for the possibility of prosecutors 
overcharging in order to offer an incentive for accepting plea bargains.    
At the time of arrest, 8,276 of the 45,954 offenders were on either probation or parole.  
Probation/parole status is a dichotomous variable with “1” indicating the offender was on 
probation/parole.  An offender‟s probation/parole status is relevant to the dependent variables as 
a prosecutor may be less likely to offer misdemeanor plea bargains or entry into diversion 






Control Variables – Legally Irrelevant Variables 
Along with considerations of race, prior research has demonstrated that other legally 
irrelevant variables may play a role in the decisions of the courtroom actors.  One such 
consideration involves the age of the offender, as younger offenders may be viewed as less 
culpable for their actions, while older offenders may benefit from increased familiarity with the 
criminal justice system.  Following the example of Steffenmeier et al (1995), age was separated 
into four dichotomous categories (Under 20; 20-29; 30-39; and 40+) in order to account for any 
possible non-linear effects the age variable may contain. 
The SCPS dataset contains 7,322 female offenders.  Gender is a dichotomous variable 
with “1” indicating female and “0” indicating male.   
Public defenders represented 18,931 of the offenders in the SCPS data.  Public defender 
is also a dichotomous variable with “1” indicating an offender used a public defender.  Such a 
variable may act as a proxy for low economic status, as demographic information on 
employment status/income for each offender is not included in the dataset.  Consistent with 
Spohn and Holleran (2000), economic status may play a role in the severity of criminal justice 
outcomes.    
Pretrial release status also impacts the likelihood of an individual having their  
charges dropped, and may also indicate relative offense severity.  This variable, originally a 
categorical variable in the original data, was transformed into a dichotomous variable with “1” 
indicating pretrial release.  The original variable also included a very small number of offenders 
(515) whose cases were dismissed after charges were filed but prior to the initial bail hearing; I 
included them under the pretrial release category.  Due to their extremely small number, I do not 
anticipate their inclusion as impacting the significance of the results either way. 
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Jurisdiction may also affect the outcomes; significant differences in the way cases are 
handled for different races in a few of the counties represented in the study could skew the 
overall results.  In order to account for any unmeasured variation as a result of geographic 
location, I included fixed-effects at the state level in my final models.  Additionally, for cross-
jurisdictional comparison purposes, I have split up the 42 counties represented into eight 
“region” variables.  These region variables were created for sampling purposes, as many of the 
smaller states did not contain enough offenders to show significant effects without being grouped 
with other states.  Four states (California/New York/Texas/Florida) contained noticeably more 
offenders than the other 15 states, with each of these four states accounting for more than 10% of 
the offenders in the sample.  Dichotomous variables were created for these states due to the large 
number of offenders in each state.  The remaining states were split up by geographic region, with 
each “region” variable accounting for roughly 10% of the overall sample. I ran separate 
regressions for each location to examine any regional effects in addition to running each state 
separately to ensure it was appropriately categorized within its region.   See Table 7 for a 
breakdown of the states included in each region and the number of offenders by location. 
 
Analysis 
 The dependent variables of interest are all measured using a binary yes/no indicator.  The 
dichotomous nature of these variables makes a logistic regression approach most appropriate.  
Logistic regression assumes an underlying latent continuous variable in order to avoid the 
violation of the assumptions of homoscedasticity, normality of the error term, and predictions 
greater than 1 or less than 0 that occur when an ordinary least squares regression uses a 
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dichotomous outcome variable (Long 1997).  The inclusion of this latent variable results in the 
prediction of the log odds of an event occurring using the following formula: 
ln(p) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + … + βkxk + ε 
 In this formula, ln(p) represents the log odds of the dependent variable occurring, β0 
represents the intercept, ε represents the error, and β1x1 through βkxk represents the change in the 
log odds for each included variable. 
Logistic regressions require comparison groups in order to make inferences about the 
likelihood of different outcomes.  I compared black and Hispanic offenders using white 
offenders as my comparison groups.  However, the issue of which case dispositions to include in 
the comparison groups involves a slightly more complicated rationale. 
 Possible case disposition outcomes include: Dismissal, Acquittal, Divert-Defer, Guilty-
Plea, Guilty-Trial, Other, Pending, and Missing.  For the dismissal regression, the comparison 
group includes all of the remaining dispositions as comparison groups as offenders who did not 
have their cases dismissed.  Such an approach contains possible temporal issues with the 
“Guilty-Plea” outcome and the “Divert-Defer” outcome.  As offenders cannot have certain 
knowledge their case will be dismissed, an offender may enter a guilty plea in a case that would 
have later been dropped.  Additionally, prosecutors may elect to use diversions in cases they 
know that the court will later dismiss.  I ran the analysis with and without the offenders who 
received diversions and entered guilty pleas in my comparison group.   
 For the charge reduction dependent variable, the comparison group includes all offenders 
who entered a plea of guilty but still received felony-level charges.  Using this comparison 
removes offenders who were not offered a plea deal or rejected the offer from the comparison 
group, ensuring I am only comparing offenders who were offered a plea deal involving a charge 
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reduction to other offenders who were offered a plea deal and were willing to plead guilty (as 
Albonetti [1990] has shown the willingness to plead guilty may differ across races).  An 
additional analysis examines only offenders who initially received a single charge, to see if such 
results differ from offenders with multiple charges.  Prosecutors may overcharge individuals in 
order to make the charge bargain seem more lucrative; only examining individuals with single-
charges prevents overcharging practices from affecting the results.   
 The analysis of diversions only contains offenders found guilty or initially pleading 
guilty.  Due to the fact that offenders must voluntarily comply with diversions, factually innocent 
offenders or offenders who have weak cases against them may elect to choose not to participate 
in the diversion.  Additionally, as not all counties offer the option of diversions, I limited my 
sample only to counties with diversions.  This step results in the loss of five counties and 4,211 
offenders from my sample.   
I ran multiple models containing different control variables, initially only including my 
independent variable of interest (race) and the dependent variables. The second model includes 
legally relevant control variables.  Final models also include legally irrelevant control variables 





 For full results of the dismissal analyses, see Table 8.  The first hypothesis predicts that 
white offenders have a greater probability than minority offenders to have their charges 
discontinued by the prosecutor or dismissed.  The sample contains 9,740 offenders who received 
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dismissals.  Of those 9,740 offenders, 2,600 (27%) are white, 4,739 (49%) are black, and 2,022 
(21%) are Hispanic.  The total sample is comprised of 31% white offenders, 43% black 
offenders, and 25% Hispanic offenders.   
After running a logistic regression, black offenders are 1.49 times more likely than white 
offenders to receive a dismissal and Hispanic offenders are .95 times more likely than white 
offenders to receive a dismissal.  However, only the control for black offenders was significant at 
the .05 level.  Although this initial regression provides evidence against my first hypothesis, it 
does not account for all the included legally relevant and irrelevant variables.   
After accounting for the legally relevant variables, an offender‟s minority status actually 
shows a slightly increased effect, with black offenders receiving dismissals at 1.50 the rate of 
whites and Hispanic offenders receiving dismissals at .93 the rate of whites.  Additionally, when 
legally relevant variables are added to the initial regression, the Hispanic variable gains 
significance at the .05 level.  This gain may be explained by legally relevant variables that also 
correlate with race – for example, minority offenders have a slightly higher prior criminal history 
than white offenders, and having a prior history decreases the likelihood of receiving a dismissal.  
Controlling for prior criminal history allows a greater isolation of the effect of race. 
Running the full model with the legally irrelevant and location controls also results in the 
finding that black offenders are 1.35 times more likely than white offenders to receive a 
dismissal and that Hispanic offenders are 1.36 times more likely than white offenders to receive 
a dismissal.
11
  The Hispanic and black variables gain significance at the .01 level when extralegal 
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 The switch from Hispanics from a negative to positive coefficient occurs as a result of including the control for 
the state of California and its large Hispanic population.  Examined separately, California shows an insignificant 
effect for Hispanics, with a coefficient of .07.  However, the number of Hispanic offenders in California impacts the 
results when it is not controlled – simply including a control for California in addition to the legally irrelevant 
variables changes the coefficient from -.01 to .23.  Adding in the remaining states pushes the Hispanic coefficient 
to the final result of .31.   
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variables are added to the model.  Thus, this model shows that black and Hispanic offenders 
receive dismissals at a significantly greater rate than white offenders.  The final iteration 
explained 16% of the variance in dismissals.
12
   
Consistent with the prior literature, the prior felony convictions, pretrial release, and 
probation/parole variables were all significant and in the expected direction.  Older offenders did 
benefit slightly in the final model, with offenders over 40 receiving dismissals at a rate 1.14 
times that of offenders aged 20-29.   
Examining dismissals using the state/region variables produces similar outcomes (see 
Table 9 for racial coefficients by state).  Black offenders are consistently favored throughout the 
country, with significant effects seen in 5 of 8 location-specific regressions accounting for 
slightly more than 70% of the total sample.  The other three locations produced insignificant 
results.  Hispanic offenders were significantly favored in 4 of 8 locations, with insignificant 
(although positive) results in the other half.  Interestingly, Hispanic offenders were favored in the 
jurisdictions with the four smallest Hispanic populations.  Explanation of variance ranged from a 
low of 4% to a high of 30%, with an average of 13%.   
 
Diversions 
 The second hypothesis also predicts an anti-minority bias in receiving pretrial diversions 
consistent with prior literature in that minorities will be less likely to receive (and accept) a 
pretrial diversion.  Diversionary outcomes are considered less severe than trial outcomes due to 
the fact that they typically do not appear as criminal convictions on an individual‟s background 
check, giving them greater job and housing options, and reducing the number of “points” an 
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 The models with guilty pleas and diverted outcomes omitted only resulted in minor changes to the OR and no 
changes in significance or direction of the race variables.  
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offender has under sentencing guidelines.  In my sample, 3,317 offenders received diversions.  
This number includes 1,255 (38%) white offenders, 976 (29%) black offenders, and 880 (27%) 
Hispanic offenders.   
Running a logistic regression with cases diverted as the dependent variable results in both 
race variables being significant and in the expected direction, with Hispanic offenders receiving 
diversions at .84 the rate of white offenders and black offenders only receiving diversions at an 
astounding .67 times the rate of whites (for full results, see Table 10).  It initially appears white 
offenders are almost 1.33 times as likely as black offenders to receive a diversion.   
Adding in the legally relevant variables actually increases the gap between white 
offenders and black offenders.  The odds ratio for black offenders drops to .63, while the odds 
ratio for Hispanic offenders remains almost stable at .85.  Both variables remain significant at the 
.01 level.   
 With the addition of the legally irrelevant and state location variables, the effect of the 
Hispanic race variable nearly disappears, failing to achieve significance at the .05 level.
13
  Black 
offenders still receive diversions at a much smaller rate than white offenders, with an odds ratio 
of .69.  Including the legally irrelevant variables increases the overall explained variance of this 
model to 26%.  The results from this model indicate that black offenders are significantly less 
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 In this case, the loss of significance appears to result from the inclusion of the pretrial release variable.  Running 
the regression without including the pretrial release control results in a significant coefficient of -.14 for Hispanics, 
equal to an odds ratio of .87.   
14
 Examining diversions specifically listed as “Prosecutor Diversion” in the data set shows similar results for black 
offenders, with an overall odds ratio of .48.  This finding is significant at the .01 level.  Similar to the model for all 
diversions, the variable for Hispanic offenders does not obtain significance.   
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  The outcomes for the control variables are roughly the same as those for dismissals.  
Once again, pretrial release significantly improves the likelihood of a positive outcome (in this 
case, receiving a diversion).  Additionally, in this model young offenders (less than 20 years old) 
are more likely to receive a diversion, while older offenders (30 years or older) are less likely.  
Offenders with “Drug Sales” or “Other Drug” offenses against them were significantly more 
likely to receive a diversion, probably due to increased use of drug treatment programs.  
“Larceny-Theft,” “Forgery,” and “Fraud” were also more likely to be diverted.  As expected, 
having a history of prior felony convictions, or being on probation/parole all significantly 
reduced an offender‟s chances of receiving a diversion.  No gender differences were observed. 
 Examining the likelihood of receiving a diversion by jurisdiction shows that white 
offenders are favored over black offenders in 5 out of 8 locations, comprising 75% of the total 
sample (see Table 11).  Once again, the other three locations do not show contrary findings, but 
merely fail to achieve significance.  The Hispanic variable fails to gain significance in any 
jurisdiction at the .05 level, although negative coefficients are obtained in 7 of the 8 location 
variables.  The lack of significant Hispanic findings may partially be due to the relatively low 
number of Hispanics who received dismissals, with fewer than 500 occurring outside of 
California.  Whites are significantly favored over Hispanics at the .1 level in two jurisdictions.  
Overall, explained variance ranged from a low of 10% to a high of 37%.  The average explained 
variance was 20%.   
 
Charge Reductions 
 The third hypothesis also predicts an anti-minority bias in charge bargaining, in this case 
appearing as an increased likelihood for white offenders to receive a charge reduction from 
felony-level charges to misdemeanor-level charges after entering a guilty plea.  To examine this 
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hypothesis, another logistic regression was run using white offenders as the comparison group.  
For full results for all models, see Table 12.  
 Unlike dismissals and diversions, running a logistic regression shows black offenders are 
not significantly more or less likely than white offenders to receive a charge reduction to a 
misdemeanor upon entering a guilty plea.  However, Hispanic offenders are significantly less 
likely to receive such a reduction, receiving reductions from felonies to misdemeanors at 
approximately .79 the rate of whites.   
Adding legally relevant variables into the model results in a slight decrease in the 
probability of Hispanic offenders receiving a reduction, decreasing the odds ratio from .79 to .77.  
Interestingly, black offenders are now significantly more likely than white offenders to receive a 
charge reduction, receiving reductions at 1.12 the rate of white offenders.  A possible 
explanation for this change involves the fact that black offenders have a greater criminal history, 
are more likely to be on probation or parole, and usually commit more violent offenses than 
whites.  When controlling for these factors, a black offender (comparable to a white offender) 
may be more likely to receive a misdemeanor charge if he or she has not already entered the 
criminal justice system.   
 The inclusion of the legally irrelevant variables and the location controls has a drastic 
impact on the results of the charge bargaining models.  Black offenders actually face a penalty in 
the charge bargaining process after accounting for these variables, receiving a reduction to a 
misdemeanor at .84 the rate of whites.
15
  The effect for Hispanics is moderated somewhat, with a 
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 Similar to the effect of California on dismissals for Hispanics, this change is primarily driven by the inclusion of 
certain states (CA, NY, and TX) that show insignificant effects for black offenders when examined separately but 
impact the overall results when not controlled.  Running the regression without the state controls results in a 
significant coefficient of .10.  The coefficient gradually drops as each state control is added into the regression until 
the final coefficient of -.17 is obtained. 
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coefficient of -.19 and an odds ratio of .83.  These results suggest that minorities are less likely to 
receive and accept the offer to plea their charges down to the misdemeanor level.
16
   
The reason for the drastic change is probably due to the positive (although insignificant) 
coefficient associated with black offenders in two of the larger jurisdictions, New York and 
California, containing approximately 40% of the total sample.  This model accounts for 24% of 
the variation in the outcome variables.   
 Assaults have a greater chance of being reduced to a misdemeanor than all the other types 
of crimes.  This result may be from the wide definition of assault – no physical contact needs to 
be made to charge someone with an assault, merely the threat of harm.  As such, assault charges 
encompass a wide variety of crimes, as they include any perceived threat as well as any non-
lethal violent acts.  Despite the violent nature of assaults, this broad definition may lend itself to 
including less serious violations within the charge.  Gender and age do not show any significant 
effects.  The rest of the control variables are similar to diversions and dismissals, with pretrial 
release significantly increasing the likelihood of an offender receiving a reduction and a prior 
history of felony convictions and being on probation/parole reducing the odds of a reduction. 
 When examining individual regions, 4 of the 8 location variables showed a significant 
negative coefficient for black offenders.  Two of the remaining regions showed no effect, while 
the other two locations showed an insignificant positive effect.  Explanations of variance ranged 
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 Offenders with single charges were also examined.  Neither racial control gained significance; this finding is most 
likely due to the rarity of offenders receiving single charges and misdemeanor convictions.  The coefficient for 





 Hypothesis 1: Whites have a greater likelihood than minorities of the prosecutor 
choosing to discontinue prosecution or having their charges dismissed. 
I did not find any evidence to support my first hypothesis, as black offenders were 
significantly more likely to receive dismissals while no significant effects were observed for 
Hispanics.
17
  Although I was unable to control for some factors that are specific to each criminal 
event and factor into the decision to prosecute (such as the amount of evidence), the fact that the 
pro-black bias was repeatedly found across the geographic controls that comprised 70% of the 
data leads me to believe that such a result is indicative of a cross-jurisdictional trend rather than 
occurring from any omitted event-level variables.  In the three geographic variables in which a 
pro-black bias was not found, contradictory results were not obtained – the black race variable 
merely did not achieve significance.  This lack of significance may be explained partially due to 
the low number of African-Americans found in the Southwest variable (425 out of 3389 
offenders) or perhaps due to a regional effect, as the other two geographic locations occurred in 
the South regional category or Texas.
18
  Similarly, a significant anti-Hispanic bias was not found 
in any jurisdiction, with a pro-Hispanic bias found in Florida, the Northeast, and the Midwest.   
 Hypothesis 2: Whites have a greater likelihood than minorities of receiving and 
accepting the option of a pretrial diversion.   
 Hypothesis 3: Whites have a greater likelihood than minorities of receiving and 
accepting the option to plea felony charges down to a misdemeanor. 
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 Again, the SCPS data does not differentiate between judicial dismissals and the election to cease prosecution, 
and no general descriptive statistics appear to exist for the prevalence of judicial dismissals.  Due to this fact, this 
variable may have captured a significant amount of judicial (rather than prosecutorial) discretion.   
18
 The South and Texas also had low explained variance for dismissals, with .05 and .10 respectively.   
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My second and third hypotheses were supported by the models, as white offenders were 
significantly more likely to receive a diversion than black offenders (including prosecutorial-
specific diversions) and have their charges reduced to the misdemeanor level when compared to 
black or Hispanic offenders.  Again, the finding for diversion was replicated across jurisdictions, 
with any geographic region that offered diversions to more than 200 offenders showing that 
blacks received and accepted diversions at a significant lower rate than whites.  One region (the 
Midwest) showed a significant pro-minority bias that may be partially explained due to the low 
number of diversions offered, with only 198 total diversions.  The remaining regions did not gain 
significance due to the low overall number of diversions in each location.  Charge bargaining 
also followed a similar geographic pattern, with 5 of the 8 regions showing a negative coefficient 
for black offenders and Hispanic offenders.  The effects of the remaining locations were not 
significant, although two regions showed a positive coefficient for each ethnic group.   
Various explanations exist why minorities might be favored in dismissals but penalized 
during the diversionary and charge bargaining phase.  Due to the fact that diversionary programs 
and charge bargaining are voluntary, minorities may simply not be willing to participate in the 
programs at the rates that white do.
19
  Although no research has been done on attitudes toward 
diversionary programs across racial lines, studies have shown that minorities tend to have less 
trust in the criminal justice system (Hagan and Albonetti 1982) and that they are less likely to 
plead guilty (Albonetti 1990). 
This potential unwillingness to engage in diversions or enter guilty pleas may also be 
directly responsible for the finding of the pro-black bias in the dismissal stage.  White offenders 
with weak cases against them may get “filtered” out earlier during the plea bargaining or 
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 This unwillingness may also be tied into criminal history, as certain diversionary programs require offenders fall 
beneath a certain number of convictions.   
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diversionary process, accounting for the increased number of cases dismissed against black 
offenders.  In this case, diversions and plea bargains would actually appear to circumvent justice, 
if prosecutors should use these processes to achieve punishments and convictions against 
offenders whose cases would later be dismissed.   
A similar alternative explanation instead focuses on actions of individuals other than the 
prosecutor involved in the process.  If police were more willing to arrest black offenders than 
white offenders in situations where there was very little concrete evidence, dismissals would 
favor minorities (assuming a low level of scrutiny on the part of the prosecutor during the filing 
process).  The other outcomes could still be explained by minorities simply being unwilling to 
participate due to their mistrust of the system.  Oliver and Mendelberg‟s (2000) study supports 
such actions on the part of the police, as it found that individuals with lower levels of education 
show a greater proclivity in accepting negative stereotypes associated with race than those with 
higher education.  In this case, prosecutors generally have attained a higher level of educational 
achievement than the arresting officers.  Improper police practices in conjunction with the lower 
rate of minority guilty pleas could actually account for the lower level of misdemeanors as well.  
If the prosecutor knew the evidence against an offender was weak, he might additionally offer a 
more lucrative deal.  “When the offer was too good, defense counsel took it as a sign something 
was wrong with the case and a better offer could be had if they waited and set if for trial” 
(Bowen 2009: 17).  If a misdemeanor offer was below the “going rate” for the crime, the defense 
attorney‟s desire to take the case to trial coupled with the general unwillingness of minorities to 
plead guilty may account for the “penalties” during charge bargaining.   
G.F. Cole‟s (1970) article supports an assertion that police practices may impact the 
actions of the prosecutor.  Cole provides evidence of an exchange relationship where various 
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actors with the criminal justice system achieve their goals through bargaining with other groups.  
Under this system, the prosecutor must rely on the police to bring him or her properly 
investigated cases.  Thus the prosecutor must balance the desire for successful prosecutions 
against the concerns that “rejections of too many cases [may] affect the morale, discipline, and 
workload of the force” (Cole 1970: 316). 
Another explanation for whites receiving diversions or reductions at a greater rate than 
minorities may involve a possible racial bias on the part of the prosecutor.  Similar to the 
research on racial proclivities toward pleading guilty, the theoretical framework of focal 
concerns theory provides an explanation for a cross-jurisdictional finding of a racial disparity 
that focuses on the attitudes and beliefs of the prosecutor. 
Focal concerns theory is based on bounded rationality in order to explain the actions of 
courtroom actors, including the prosecutor.  Under this theory, prosecutors make decisions based 
on a combination of available information and their own perceptions.  They include such 
perceptions in their decisions due to the fact that they must act without certain and complete 
knowledge.  Albonetti proposed this idea, stating, “In the situation of having incomplete 
knowledge, the actor attempts to reduce uncertainty by relying upon a rationality that is the 
product of habit and social structure” (Albonetti 1991: 249).  As courtroom actors cannot 
possibly know which offenders will reoffend with any degree of certainty, they must rely on 
imperfect schemas to approximate rates of recidivating.  When negative racial stereotypes 
unduly influence a courtroom actor, he or she produces an anti-minority bias in an attempt to 
reduce the uncertainty of future recidivism.
20
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 The work of Hill et al. (1985) supports such an assertion with their etiology of bias theory, where individuals rely 




  Thus, the prosecutor is driven by the need to reduce uncertainty in the decisions he or she 
must make daily while fulfilling his or her role in the criminal justice system.  Without the 
knowledge of all possible alternatives, however, the prosecutor must rely on “due process 
requirements and „general routinized stock responses‟ to a set of stimuli posed by each felony 
case” (Albonetti 1987: 294).  As such, the stereotypical portrayals of offenders and the links 
between social classes and certain types of behavior lead to possible racial discrepancies in the 
actions of the prosecutor.   
Prosecutors…are faced with uncertainty that may lead them to develop decision-making 
schema that incorporate past practices and reflect the subtle influences of social and 
cultural stereotypes in society.  These stereotypes emerge through an attribution process 
that links prosecutorial concerns with community safety to individual characteristics like 
race, ethnicity, age, and gender (Shermer and Johnson 2009: 9-10)    
 
Enhanced by the lack of accountability in prosecutorial decision making, prosecutors may 
rely on these conceptions and positive past practices to perpetuate social inequality (Shermer and 
Johnson 2009).     
Steffenmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer expanded upon Albonetti‟s initial work examining 
bounded rationality to create a new theory where courtroom actors form their decisions based on 
a few key considerations.  They state that the criminal justice system punishes criminals 
according to three primary “focal concerns:” culpability of the offender and damage caused to 
victim, practical limitations, and protection of the community (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and 
Kramer 1998).   Courtroom actors use these concerns as a way to quickly classify each situation 
into schemas and thus guide their decisions within the context of the criminal justice system. 
Under the focal concern of “protection of the community,” offenders perceived as more 
“dangerous” will receive more sanctions in the criminal justice system.  Steffensmeier et al 
postulate that stereotypical characterizations of criminals based on race may play a role in 
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determining the threat of a particular offender.  They state, “Hence, one might expect that 
[courtroom actors]…may share in the general stereotyping predominant in the community; and 
that racial attributions will…influence [courtroom actors]” (Steffenmeiser et al 1998: 768).  If 
young, black males represent the “dangerous” class in society (Leiber and Johnson 2008), a 
finding of bias in the criminal justice system results from a commonly held notion that minority 
offenders pose a greater risk to the community.
21
     
Diversions offer the perfect venue for prosecutors to act on these anti-minority 
stereotypes.  Due to the fact diversions “emphasize purposive rationales like rehabilitation over 
the goal of proportional punishment, these alternatives actually require consideration of the kinds 
of subjective criteria that are likely to produce sentencing disparities” (Engen et al 2003: 125).  
Unlike the trial and dismissal process where matters of fact are concerned, prosecutors must 
consider the danger and blameworthiness of the offender prior to entering them into a 
diversionary program.  These considerations mirror the prosecutor‟s focal concerns, causing 
racial attributions to factor into the decision.     
The large amount of unchecked prosecutorial discretion in charge bargaining also allows 
prosecutors to include extralegal characteristics when determining what charges to offer a 
defendant.  “Commentators therefore characterize plea bargaining as prosecutors‟ unilateral 
determination of the level of defendants‟ criminal culpability and the appropriate punishment for 
defendants” (Ma 2002: 26).  Once again, the perceptions of the offender enter into the decision 
making process.  By allowing these discretion points to remain largely unchecked, the possibility 
exists that prosecutors allow societal-wide stereotypes to influence their decision making, 
resulting in the observed “penalty” for an offender‟s minority status.   
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 For empirical evidence that supports prosecutors acting upon stereotypes to protect the community, see 
Johnson and Betsinger (2009).  
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 Hypothesis 4: Whites will be consistently favored across jurisdictions when 
comparing the results of each geographic location. 
Consistent with explanations that include cultural-wide attributions of racial stereotypes, 
the findings were generally uniform across geographic locations.  There were almost no results 
that significantly differed from the other geographic locations for any of the three dependent 
variables – all locations were either significant and in the same direction or insignificant.  The 
only exception was the Midwest region for black offenders in the analysis of diversions, which 
showed a significant positive effect but may be accounted for by the very small number of 
offenders who received diversions in the Midwest in the sample (198).  For black offenders, 
significant findings for geographic locations were found for at least 4 of the 8 geographical 
controls for each variable.  The Hispanic outcomes failed to gain significance in many of the 
region-specific models – possibly partially a sampling issue, as some of the regions contained 
very few Hispanic offenders.    
Finally, I must emphasize the fact that these processes are extremely complex and 
decisions are based on a multitude of factors, many of which are not included by the SCPS or are 
unobservable in quantitative research.  Despite the evidence that indicates an offender‟s race 
affects the process, it is very possible that this result is spurious and occurs due to one of these 
omitted variables and not as a result of any racial bias on the part of any actor.  For example, 
although I include location variables for state and geographical region, the very neighborhood an 
offender lives in may affect the types of crimes committed and the willingness of bystanders to 
testify (both legally relevant considerations).  The correlation between neighborhood and race 
would make a racial effect appear due to the omission of the neighborhood variable.
22
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 Burgess’ classic work (1925) on concentric zones in cities provides evidence of such a correlation between 
neighborhoods and race.   
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an offender‟s race changes the likelihood of each outcome, this change is not necessarily the 




 This project provides evidence that an offender‟s race (or, at the very least, an 
uncontrolled variable that correlates with an offender‟s race) significantly changes the expected 
outcomes during the pre-conviction phases of the trial process.  Black and Hispanic offenders are 
more likely to have their cases dismissed, but also less likely to receive and accept the option of 
entering an alternative diversionary program.  Black offenders are also less likely to receive a 
misdemeanor after entering a guilty plea.  These relationships held despite controls for offense 
severity, offense type, gender, age, prior felony convictions, probation/parole status, location, 
and use of a public defender.   
 Although these points of discretion drastically affect which offenders later must be 
sentenced, only a fraction of the amount of research done on sentencing has focused on the 
dismissal/diversion points.  Although sentencing guidelines have been implemented in an 
attempt to reform sentencing, “researchers argue that sentencing disparities persist under 
guidelines, in part, because these discretionary departure provisions are used in ways that 
disadvantage minority defendants” (Engen et al. 2001: 100).  These processes may allow 
courtroom actors to circumvent the restrictions of the sentencing guidelines, continuing a pattern 
of racial disparity within the criminal justice system.  “Claims of criminal injustice represent a 
significant form of conflict because they raise fundamental doubts about the operational meaning 
of principles (like equality before the law) on which American society is based” (Hagan and 
Albonetti 1982: 332).   
43 
 
The findings of a racial disparity within the pre-sentencing stages of the process were 
found in a large sample including multiple jurisdictions. Due to the number of separate courts 
and officials, explanations of this disparity must include a framework that encompasses the entire 
criminal justice system.  Although local effects (such as pressure from politicians) undoubtedly 
play a role in the prosecutor‟s decision making, they do not explain the consistent finding that 
minorities are treated differently within the system.  The focal concerns framework provides a 
societal-level explanation that drives prosecutors‟ behaviors through influential racial stereotypes 
and beliefs.   
Of course, the inability to control for all of these jurisdictional and offense-specific 
events preclude any definitive conclusions regarding the exact reasons race affects these 
processes.  In order to build on this initial study, further research must be done examining these 
points of discretion with a focus on explaining these racial disparities.  Given the research on 
racial participation in the criminal justice system (e.g. Albonetti 1992), future research should 
first address any voluntary differences in the willingness of minorities to participate in the 
diversionary or charge bargaining process.  The attention focal concerns gives to societal racial 
stereotypes should also be addressed through studies looking at prosecutor‟s attitudes regarding 
offenders and their resulting actions.  Further steps must examine the reasons why minorities 
receive dismissals at a greater rate.  Due to the extreme difficulty in obtaining quantitative data 
sets capturing many of the legally relevant variables involved in dismissals (such as strength of 
evidence), a qualitative approach may be best for further research.  
This current research has many limitations due to the current state of data and limited 
prior interest in these prosecutorial points of discretion. Despite these shortcomings, this project 
contributes a multi-jurisdictional look at the racial disparities that still exist in the rarely 
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examined pre-sentencing courtroom outcomes.  With greater scrutiny of these pre-sentencing 
processes, we can progress toward a truly “colorblind” criminal justice system.     
 
TABLE 1 - SUMMARY OF PRIOR LITERATURE 
Study Outcome 
Multiple 
Jurisdictions? Racial Effects 
Petersilia (1983) Charge/Reject No Yes; Minorities more likely to receive felony charges 
Spohn et al. (1987) Charge/Reject; 
Dismissals 
Yes* Yes; Minorities more likely to receive charges 
Spohn et al. (2001) Charge/Reject No No; Sample contained 140 sex offenders 
LaFree (1980) Charge/Reject No Yes; More charges for minorities assaulting white women 
Paternoster (1984) Capital Charges No Yes; More capital charges for minorities killing whites 
Weiss et al. (1996) Capital Charges No Yes; More capital charges for minorities killing whites 
Albonetti (1986) Charge/Reject No Did not examine racial effects 
Frazier and Haney (1996) Charge/Reject No Did not examine racial effects 
Frohmann (1991) Charge/Reject Yes** Did not examine racial effects 
Schmidt and Steury (1989) Charge/Reject No Did not examine racial effects 
Spohn and Spears (1997) Charge/Reject No No 
Spears and Spohn (1997) Charge/Reject No No 
Jordan et al. (2003) Dismissals No No; Sample contained 300 sex offenders 
Ryan et al. (2007) Dismissals No Yes; Blacks/Hispanics less likely to have cases dismissed 
Albonetti (1996) Diversions No Mixed; Minorities with no prior record penalized 
Engen et al. (2003) Diversions No Yes; Minorities less likely to receive diversions 
Leiber and Johnson (2008) Diversions No Yes; Black offenders less likely to receive diversions 
Leiber and Stairs (1999) Diversions No Yes; Black offenders less likely to receive diversions 
Leiber (1994) Diversions No Yes; Black offenders less likely to receive diversions 
Leiber et al. (2007) Diversions Yes*** Yes; Black offenders less likely to receive diversions 
Barrett et al. (2006) Diversions No Yes; Black offenders more likely to receive diversions 
Bernstein et al. (1977) Charge 
Bargaining 
No No 
Holmes et al. (1987) Charge 
Bargaining 
Yes*** Yes; Minorities received better charge bargains in both locations 
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Albonetti 1992 Charge 
Bargaining 
No No 
Farnworth and Teske (1995) Charge 
Bargaining 
No Yes; Black females less likely to have charges reduced 
Ball (2006) Charge 
Bargaining 
No No; Very few white/Hispanic offenders in sample (< 10% each) 
Bushway and Piehl (2007) Charge 
Bargaining 
Yes*** Yes; Whites received better charge bargains 
Shermer and Johnson (2009) Charge 
Bargaining 
Yes* Mixed; Racial differences existed when examining offense type + race 





* Multiple Jurisdictions 





TABLE 2 - SUMMARY OF VARIABLES 
        
Variable Coding Description 
    Dependent Variables 
    
 
Charges Dismissed Dichotomous (0,1) A value of 1 indicates an offender's charges were 
dismissed. 
 
Charges Diverted Dichotomous (0,1) A value of 1 indicates an offender was selected for a 
diversion program. 
 
Charges Reduced to 
Misdemeanor 
Dichotomous (0,1) A value of 1 indicates an offender's felony charges 
were reduced to the misdemeanor level. 
   Independent Variables 
    
 








Dichotomous (0,1) Comparison group; 1 indicates a white offender. 
Control Variables   
    
 
Gender Dichotomous (0,1) A value of 1 indicates the offender is female. 
 
Age Ordinal Split into four groups: ≤ 19; 20-29; 30-39; 40+  
 
Prior Felony Convictions Continous (Right-truncated) Offenders with 10+ convictions listed as having 10 
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 The 2000, 2002, and 2004 SCPS data originally omitted the Hispanic variable in the “race” coding, choosing to include the other five categories and using a 
separate dichotomous variable for defendants of Hispanic descent.  These racial and ethnic variables were combined into one race/ethnicity category that 
included Hispanics.  The large majority of individuals currently coded as “Hispanic” originally fell into the “missing” racial category, accounting for 8,303 of the 
9,631 Hispanics included in the sample.  The other 1,086 were originally coded as “white.”  Only 121 of the 16,152 black defendants were coded as also being 
of Hispanic descent; I chose to include them as black defendants, as it was not clear which identity should take precedence.  The extremely small number of 
defendants coded as both black and Hispanic lead me to believe this decision did not affect the results.  No defendants were coded as Hispanic and Asian or 




Pretrial Release Dichotomous (0,1) A value of 1 indicates an offender was released prior 
to trial. 
 
Public Defender Dichotomous (0,1) A value of 1 indicates an offender used a public 
defender. 
 
Number of Charges Continous Indicates initial number of charges filed against an 
individual. 
 
Probation/Parole Status Dichotomous (0,1) A value of 1 indicates an offender was on probation 
or parole at time of arrest. 
 
Type of Offense Dichotomous (0,1) Set of 16 control variables: Murder, Rape, Robbery, 
Assault, Other Violent, Burglary, Larceny-Theft, 
Motor Vehicle Theft, Forgery, Fraud, Other 
Property, Drug Sales, Other Drug, Weapons, 
Driving Related, Other Public Order.  All offense 
types are mutually exclusive, coded as the most 
serious offense at filing.   
 
Location Dichotomous (0,1) Set of 19 state variables: Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawai‟i, 
Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, and Virginia.  Also split into 8 regional 
variables for individual analysis: California, Florida, 
New York, Texas, Northeast, Midwest, South, 
Southwest.  See Table 7 for a full description of each 
region. 
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TABLE 3 – DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
     N / Mean % / S.D 
TOTAL 39,639 100% 
Dismissed 9,740 24.57% 
Guilty Plea 25,062 63.23% 
Guilty Plea w/Misdemeanor 3,617 9.12% 
Diverted 3,317 8.37% 
Female 7,322 18.47% 
Age 31.16 10.54 
Prior Felony Convictions 1.29 2.16 
Pretrial Release 21,850 55.12% 
Public Defender 18,931 47.76% 
Number of Charges 2.26 1.63 
Offenders with Single 
Charge 16,784 42.34% 
On Probation/Parole 7,877 19.87% 
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 TABLE 4 – DESCRIPTION OF DATA BY RACE 
 
 
        Total White % Black % Hispanic % 
TOTAL 39,639 11,841 30% 16,152 41% 9,631 24% 
Dismissed 9,740 2,600 27% 4,739 49% 2,022 21% 
Guilty Plea 25,062 7,620 30% 9,558 38% 6,501 26% 
Misdemeanor 3,617 1,222 34% 1,567 43% 828 23% 
Diverted 3,317 1,255 38% 976 29% 880 27% 
Female 7,322 2,707 37% 2,984 41% 1,191 16% 
Age 31.16* 32.71* 10.68* 31.11* 10.77* 29.28* 9.64* 
Prior Fel. Conv. 1.29* 1.14* 2.05* 1.63* 2.4* 0.96* 1.78* 
Pretrial Release 21,850 7,084 32% 8,807 40% 4,744 22% 
Public Defender 18,931 5,201 27% 8,161 43% 4,660 25% 
Number of Charges 2.26* 2.31* 1.67* 2.24* 1.66* 2.23* 1.52* 
Single Charge 16,784 4,929 29% 7,114 42% 3,902 23% 
On Prob./Parole 7,866 2,300 29% 3,153 40% 2,078 26% 
 
 




TABLE 5 - MISSING DATA 
           Total % White % Black  % Hispanic % 
Female 24 < 1% 1  - 9  - 3 -  
Age 490 1.24% 14  - 27  - 181 -  
Prior Felony 
Convictions* 
1529 3.86% 478  - 559  - 358 -  
Pretrial Release* 1117 4.15% 437  - 472 - 155  - 
Public Defender* 8302 20.94% 2555 31% 3401 41% 1905 23% 
Time to Trial (Days) 1131 2.85% 381  - 369  - 266 -  
Number of Charges 37 < 1% 13  - 10  - 14  - 
On Probation/Parole* 2716 6.18% 743 27% 1064 39% 733 27% 
Total 39,639 100% 11,841 30% 16,152 41% 9,631 24% 
         * If examined by race, all variables missing for > 4% of the total sample fall within +/- 3% of the 
racial proportions for the total sample. 
* If examined by race, missing variables fall within +/- 3% of the racial proportions for 
the total sample. 
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TABLE 6 - DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES BY RACE 
 
            
  RACE 
  White % Black % Hispanic % 
Total 11841 30% 16152 41% 9631 24% 
Murder 71 21% 176 52% 90 27% 
Rape 203 32% 277 43% 163 25% 
Robbery 432 18% 1378 58% 569 24% 
Assault 1495 28% 2407 45% 1499 28% 
Other Violent 663 37% 584 33% 542 30% 
Burglary 1223 36% 1340 39% 853 25% 
Larceny-Theft 1285 35% 1748 47% 660 18% 
Motor Vehicle Theft 452 32% 440 31% 535 37% 
Forgery 564 39% 637 44% 256 18% 
Fraud 507 38% 594 44% 245 18% 
Other Property 638 36% 833 46% 321 18% 
Drug Sales 1571 22% 3836 54% 1755 25% 
Other Drug 2972 34% 3439 40% 2247 26% 
Weapons 229 19% 663 55% 310 26% 
Driving Related 674 47% 346 24% 401 28% 





TABLE 7 - OFFENDERS BY STATE 
State Total White Black Hispanic 
California 12712 27.66% 3756 29.55% 2920 22.97% 4985 39.21% 
Florida 4378 9.53% 1584 36.18% 2028 46.32% 754 17.22% 
New 
York 4766 10.37% 932 19.56% 2340 49.10% 1308 27.44% 
Texas 5090 11.08% 1583 31.10% 1803 35.42% 1632 32.06% 
Northeast 4351 9.47% 697 16.02% 2992 68.77% 486 11.17% 
Midwest 6112 13.30% 1848 30.24% 3815 62.42% 306 5.01% 
South 4628 10.07% 1340 28.95% 2977 64.33% 207 4.47% 
Southwest 3917 8.52% 1798 45.90% 425 10.85% 1166 29.77% 
          Northeast includes Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennslyvania. 
Midwest includes Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. 
South includes Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, Tennessee, and Virginia. 






TABLE 8 - DISMISSALS 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Final Model 
 
ß OR ß OR ß Std. Err. OR 
Black .40** 1.49** .41** 1.50** .30** .03 1.35 
Hispanic -.06 .95 -.07* .93* .31** .04 1.36 
Prior Felony 
Convictions - - -.02** .98** -.01* .01 .99 
On 
Probation/Parole - - -.57** .56** -.09* .04 .91 
Murder - - -.77** .46** -.62** .18 .54 
Rape - - -.42** .66** -.47** .11 .63 
Robbery - - -.38** .68** -.31** .06 .73 
Other Violent - - -.26** .77** -.19** .07 .83 
Burglary - - -.77** .46** -.66** .06 .52 
Larceny - Theft - - -.71** .49** -.84** .06 .43 
Motor Vehicle 
Theft - - -.58** .56** -.36** .08 .70 
Forgery - - -.83** .44** -1.04** .08 .35 
Fraud - - -.96** .38** -1.05** .09 .35 
Other Property - - -.37** .69** -.50** .07 .61 
Drug Sales - - -1.00** .37** -1.08** .05 .34 
Other Drug - - -.70** .49** -.64** .05 .53 
Weapons - - -.67** .51** -.65** .09 .52 
Driving Related - - -1.47** .23** -1.64** .10 .19 
Other Public Order - - -.37** .69** -.51** .08 .60 
Female  - - - - -.03 .04 - 
Age < 20 - - - - -.11* .04 .90 
Age 30 - 39 - - - - .04 .03 - 
Age > 39 - - - - .13** .04 1.14 
Public Defender
24
 - - - - .26** .04 1.30 
Pretrial Release - - - - .37** .03 1.45 
Fixed Effects - 
State - - - - 
See 
Note 
         * Significant at the .05 level 
       ** Significant at the .01 level 
       NOTE: Fixed effects for state were included in the final model but not reported. 
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missing observations.  A control for missing observations was included in the final model. The coefficients for the 




TABLE 9 - DISMISSALS BY REGION 
State Black Hispanic R² 
    β OR β OR   
California .48** 1.61 .07 - .04 
Florida .27** 1.31 .60** 1.82 .13 
New 
York .40** 1.49 .20 - .25 
Texas -.14 - .17 - .10 
Northeast .51** 1.67 .54** 1.72 .07 
Midwest .28** 1.32 .49** 1.63 .09 
South .03 - .64** 1.90 .05 
Southwest -.17 - .00 - .30 
Total .30** 1.35 .31** 1.36 .16 
       Northeast includes Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania 
Midwest includes Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan 
South includes Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, Tennessee, and Virginia 
Southwest includes Arizona, Hawai‟i, and Utah 
 
Legally relevant and irrelevant variables (identical to the final general model) were included as 
controls but not reported. 
 
*Significant at the .05 level 




TABLE 10 - DIVERSIONS 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Final Model 
  ß OR ß OR ß Std. Err. OR 
Black -.40** .67 -.46** .63 -.37** .06 .69 
Hispanic -.18** .84 -.16** .85 -.06 .06 - 
Prior Felony 
Convictions - - -.43** .74 -.39** .02 .68 
On Probation/Parole - - -.76** .47 -.48** .08 .62 
Murder - - None - None - - 
Rape - - -.34 .71 -.02 .24 - 
Robbery - - -.65** .52 -.22 .16 - 
Other Violent - - -.37** .69 -.30* .15 1.35 
Burglary - - -.11 .90 .03 .11   
Larceny - Theft - - .37** 1.45 .28** .10 1.32 
Motor Vehicle Theft - - -.15 .86 -.05 .10 - 
Forgery - - .25* 1.28 .53** .14 1.70 
Fraud - - .68** 1.97 .70** .13 2.01 
Other Property - - -.30* .74 .03 .15 - 
Drug Sales - - -.06 .94 .28** .09 1.32 
Other Drug - - 1.00** 2.72 1.18** .08 3.25 
Weapons - - -.63** .53 -.07 .21 .67 
Driving Related - - -.24 .79 -.40* .16 .67 
Other Public Order - - .03 1.03 .15 .15 - 
Female  - - - - .22** .05 1.25 
Age < 20 - - - - .36** .07 1.43 
Age 30 - 39 - - - - -.15* .06 .86 
Age > 39 - - - - -.22** .06 .80 
Public Defender - - - - -.29** .06 .75 
Pretrial Release - - - - 1.11** .06 3.03 
Fixed Effects - State - - - - 
See 
Note 
         * Significant at the .05 level 
       ** Significant at the .01 level 
 
 




TABLE 11 - DIVERSIONS BY REGION 
State Black Hispanic R² 
  
β OR β OR   
California -.45** .64 -.05 - .39 
Florida -.62** .54 -.15 - .14 
New 
York -.84 - -1.30^ .27 .14 
Texas -.26** .77 -.13 .88 .18 
Northeast .35 - .02 - .17 
Midwest .46* 1.58 -.15 - .33 
South -.31* .73 -.68^ .51 .10 
Southwest .22 - -.23 - .13 
Total -.37** .69 -.05 - .26 
       Northeast includes Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania 
Midwest includes Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan 
South includes Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, Tennessee, and Virginia 
Southwest includes Arizona, Hawai‟i, and Utah 
 
Legally relevant and irrelevant variables (identical to the final general model) were included as 
controls but not reported. 
 
*Significant at the .05 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
^ Significant at the .1 level  
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TABLE 12 - CHARGE REDUCTIONS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Final Model 
  ß OR ß OR ß Std. Err. OR 
Black .04   .11* 1.12 -.17** .05 .84 
Hispanic -.23** .82 -.26** .77 -.19** .06 .83 
Prior Felony 
Convictions - - -.13** .88 -.11** .01 .90 
On Probation/Parole - - -.59** .55 -.20** .06 .82 
Murder     -2.89** .06 -3.07** .73 .05 
Rape - - -1.03** .36 -1.56** .21 .21 
Robbery - - -.97** .38 -1.27** .12 .28 
Other Violent - - -.41** .66 -.42** .11 .66 
Burglary - - -.76** .47 -.89** .09 .41 
Larceny - Theft - - -.37** .69 -.73** .09 .48 
Motor Vehicle Theft - - -1.11** .33 -.90** .14 .41 
Forgery - - -.25* .78 -.70** .12 .50 
Fraud - - -.49** .61 -.66** .13 .52 
Other Property - - -.30** .74 -.47** .11 .63 
Drug Sales - - -1.01** .36 -1.45** .08 .23 
Other Drug - - -1.08** .34 -1.21** .08 .30 
Weapons - - -.69** .50 -.78** .13 .46 
Driving Related - - -.78** .46 -1.06** .12 .35 
Other Public Order - - .02 - -.28* .16 .76 
Female  - - - - -.06 .06 - 
Age < 20 - - - - -.09 .06 - 
Age 30 - 39 - - - - .06 .05 - 
Age > 39 - - - - .03 .06 - 
Public Defender - - - - .25** .05 1.28 
Pretrial Release - - - - .54** .05 1.72 
Fixed Effects - State - - - - 
See 
Note 
  * Significant at the .05 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
 
NOTE: Fixed effects for state were included in the final model but not reported. 
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TABLE 13 - CHARGE REDUCTIONS BY REGION 
State Black Hispanic R² 
  
β OR β OR   
California .00 - -.22* .80 .08 
Florida -.54** .58 -.35 - .15 
New 
York .11 - .01 - .49 
Texas .17 - .38 - .16 
Northeast -.37* .69 -.42 - .11 
Midwest -.36* .70 -.90* .41 .12 
South -.07 - .16 1.17 .10 
Southwest -.61* .54 -.90** .41 .09 
Total -.17** .84 -.19** .83 .24 
       Northeast includes Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania 
Midwest includes Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan 
South includes Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, Tennessee, and Virginia 
Southwest includes Arizona, Hawai‟i, and Utah 
 
Legally relevant and irrelevant variables (identical to the final general model) were included as 
controls but not reported. 
 
*Significant at the .05 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
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